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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- No. 16355 
LARRY VALE POTTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with three criminal counts 
(all statutory references are to the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended): 
1. Aggravated robbery in violation of § 76-6-302 
(l)(a); 
2. Failure to stop at the command of a police 
officer, in violation of§ 41-6-169.10; and 
3. Aggravated assault, in violation of § 76-5-103. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury which found appellant 
guilty as to counts one and two. Appellant was acquitted of 
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the third count. 
Appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in 
the Utah State Prison qf from five years to life, and fined 
$2,000. The prison sentence was suspended, as was $1,500 of 
the fine. Appellant was placed on probation for a period of 
five years. 
Appellant's probation was subsequently revoked, and 
he was committed to the Utah State Prison to serve his original 
sentence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his convictions for 
aggravated robbery and failure to stop at command of a police 
officer, and a reversal of the judgment revoking his probation 
and committing him to the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on the morning of Febru-
ary 22, 1978, Mr. and Mrs. Von Wayne Johnston were awakened by 
a knocking on the door of their home. Mr. Johnston went to the 
door, and observed appellant standing, armed with a revolver. 
Mr. Johnston asked appellant what he wanted. Appellant stated 
that he wanted to come in. He then entered the home. Mr. 
Johnston again asked appellant what he wanted. Appellant re-
plied that he wanted a roll of toilet paper and some matches. 
Mr. and Mrs. Johnston immediately procured toilet paper and 
matches and placed them in appellant's hat. 
-2-
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Appellant then said to Mrs. Johnston, "Ma'am, it's 
best that you go to the right. Me and your husband can handle 
this now (Tr. 18.) 
Appellant and Mr. Johnston then stepped outside. 
Appellant fumbled with his hat and the toilet paper. He 
seemed nervous. He thanked Mr. Johnston, and shook his hand. 
Appellant then got in his car and drove off rather hurriedly. 
Mr. Johnston went back inside. Mrs. Johnston called the High-
way Patrol. 
Officers intercepted appellant's auto soon thereafter. 
After a high-speed chase in which appellant apparently dis-
charged his revolver, and in which appellant tried to run the 
pursuing officers off the road, he was finally subdued. 
Mr. and Mrs. Johnston testified that during the in-
cident in their home, appellant was always polite, although 
he spoke with authority, and that he never threatened them 
or raised his weapon. Mr. and Mrs. Johnston agreed that ap-
pellant seemed in a daze, and that his eyes were without ex-
pression, staring blankly, starry-eyed. Mr. Johnston testi-
fied that appellant appeared to be very incoherent, without 
his senses, and "not in the same world as us" (Tr. 9). Mr. 
Johnston firmly felt that appellant was "on dope" and without 
his faculties (Tr. 12, 16). 
All of the arresting officers agreed that appellant 
had none of the earmarks of a typical drunken driver, i.e., 
-3-
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his speech was not slurred, he had no trouble walking, and 
while he was driving in an extremely reckless manner, he ap-
peared to have complete control of his vehicle. They testi-
fied that appellant never pointed his revolver at any of them 
during his arrest. 
Officer Larry Prince testified that while he could 
not detect whether appellant had been drinking, appellant was 
acting "abnormally," was "incoherent," without his senses, 
and "not in the same world as us" (Tr. 38, 39). 
At approximately 3:00 a.m. appellant underwent a 
blood alcohol test, which was introduced as evidence. It 
showed the concentration of ethyl alcohol in his blood to be 
.24%, approximately 1-1/2 hours after the incident began. 
This is three times the statutory presumption of intoxication. 
Appellant testified that he had no memory of the 
incident, that he recalled having about five drinks of whiskey, 
and that his next memory was wakening in a jail cell. The 
evidence showed that in addition to the whiskey, appellant 
had consumed quantities of beer, tequila, Colbenemid, and 
Benemid. The evidence also showed that appellant had suffered 
a head injury in 1974 which left a "cortical scar," with re-
sultant abnormal electroencephalogram, and that ap~ellant had 
been under medication for gout since the age of 25, taking t'''o 
tablets of Benemid or. Colbenemid every day, including the day 
of the incident. 
-4-
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After his conviction (from which this appeal was 
perfected), appellant was placed on probation. Among the 
terms and con~itions of the probation set out in the judgment 
of the trial court dated February 21, 1979, were the follow-
ing: 
3. That the said defendant remain 
in present treatment with Dr. 
Lincoln Clark and enter alcohol 
therapy as designated by the 
Adult Probation and Parole 
Department. 
4. That the said defendant sub-
mit to a breathalyzer test at 
the discretion of the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department 
within reasonable circumstances 
and hours. 
5. That the said defendant totally 
abstain from the use of alco-
holic beverages . . . . 
The events whereby appellant allegedly violated the 
conditions of his probation occurred very early on the morning 
of April 27, 1979. Officer Lawrence Penrod answered a call 
and met Ms. Lucille Begay, who was at that time standing in 
the driveway at the home of one Mr. Trokvine. Ms. Begay re-
lated that she had been "assaulted" by appellant, and that she 
wanted to get her clothes from the residence that appellant 
shared with Mr. Randy Diamanti. 
Officer Penrod proceeded with Ms. Begay to appel-
lant's residence. Two other peace officers were summoned, as 
-5-
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was Agent Nat Roth and Mr. Evan Reid. When Mr. Reid arrived 
on the scene the entire party entered the residence, with the 
consent of Ms. Begay. 
Mr. Reid and the officers proceeded to appellant's 
bedroom door. Mr. Reid tested the knob, finding that it was 
locked. He then knocked on the door, awakening appellant. 
Appellant came to the door where an extremely brief scuffle 
ensued between appellant and Mr. Reid. Appellant retreated in-
to his bedroom. 
Mr. Reid asked appellant if he would submit to a 
breathalyzer test. Appellant, after asking if Mr. Reid had a 
search warrant, stated that he had to get up early to go to 
work, and was therefore returning to bed. (These events appar-
ently occurred at approximately 1:00. a.m., the exact time 
being unknown. See Tr. 9.) 
Appellant subsequently opened his bedroom door, 
brought one drawer from a dresser, and deposited it on the 
floor of the living room area, stating that it contained Ms. 
Begay's clothing. The clothing was gathered, and the entire 
party then left the residence. 
The trial court found that Ms. Begay had a sufficient 
"proprietary interest" in appellant's residence to consent to 
the entrance by Mr. Reid, Agent Roth, and the officers. The 
court further found that appellant had violated his probation, 
and revoked the same. Again, appellant appealed. 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY OF AGGRA-
VATED ROBBERY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The definition of the offense of aggravated robbery 
is to be found in the Utah Criminal Code. (All statutory 
citations are Utah Code Annotated (1953) unless otherwise in-
dicated.) Section 76-6-301 states: 
Robbery is the unlawful and 
intentional taking of personal 
property in the possession of 
another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his 
will, accomplished by means of 
force or fear. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Section 76-6-302 states: 
A person commits aggravated 
robbery if in the course of com-
mitting robbery, he: (a) uses a 
firearm or a facsimile of a fire-
arm, knife or a facsimile of a 
knife or a deadly weapon; or (b) 
causes serious bodily injury 
upon another. (Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, the statutory offense of aggravated 
robbery may be described as having four elements: 
1. There must be an intentional and 
unjustifiable taking of personal 
property. 
-7-
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2. The property must be taken from 
the person of another, or from his 
immediate presence. 
3. Force or fear must be used to ob-
tain the property. The taking must 
be against the will of the rightful 
possessor. 
4. A gun, knife, facsimile thereof, or 
a deadly weapon must be used to 
provide the force or fear; or seri-
ous bodily injury must have resulted 
to another. 
Appellant concedes that the evidence was sufficient 
to support a conviction as to elements 2-4 above. Appellant 
is admittedly guilty of having committed acts that are of a 
seriously antisocial nature. 
The evidence did not, however, prove beyond a reason-
able doubt the first element above described, an intentional 
taking of property. 
In order to determine what conduct constitutes "an 
intentional taking," we must look first to the statutes. The 
definition of "intentional" is found in Section 76-2-103(1): 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent 
or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a re-
sult of his conduct, when it is 
his conscious objective or desire 
to engage ~n the conduct or cause 
the result. (Emphasis added.) 
-8-
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As discussed below, the evidence at trial showed 
rather clearly that when appellant committed the acts in ques-
tion, he was incapable of forming 
... a conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct 
or cause the result. 
(§ 76-2-103)(1), emphasis added.) 
Section 76-2-103 is not the only statute dealing 
with the so-called "mens rea" that is generally associated 
with criminal liability. 
Section 76-2-305 provides: 
(1) In any prosecution for an 
offense, it shall be a defense 
that the defendant, at the time 
of the proscribed conduct, as a 
result of mental disease or de-
fect, lacked substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the require-
ments of law. 
(2) As used in this section, the 
terms "mental disease" or "defect" 
do not include an abnormality 
manifested only by repeated 
criminal or otherwise antisocial 
conduct. 
This author's research reveals only one case where 
this court has dealt with this statute, State v. Dominguez, 
564 P.2d 768 (Utah 1977). There a conviction for aggravated 
assault was affirmed. The court held that the trial court's 
-9-
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instructions on the defense of insanity were not prejudicial 
to the defendant, even though they were not based on § 76-2-305, 
. . . because the District Court 
gave as a part of its instruction 
that insanity can exist when the 
defendant is 'irresponsible or 
1artly responsible.' 
564 P.2d at 770, emphasis added 
by the court.) 
The court reasoned that therefore the defendant was 
not denied the arguably more liberal defense that is provided 
by § 76-2-305, which 
. only requires defendant to 
lack substantial capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct . 
(564 P.2d at 770, emphasis supplied 
by the court.) 
As is discussed below, the evidence in the case at 
bar clearly met the standard enunciated in Dominguez, supra, 
to entitle appellant to an acquittal. 
One other statute bears heavily on the question of 
an "intentional taking." Section 76-2-306 provides: 
Voluntary intoxication shall not 
be a defense to a criminal charge 
unless such intoxication negates 
the existence of the mental state 
which is an element of the offense; 
however, if recklessness or crirn~­
nal negligence establishes an 
element of an offense, and the 
actor is unaware of the risk 
-10-
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because of voluntary intoxica-
tion, his unawareness is imma-
terial in a prosecution for that 
offense. (Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Dewey, 41 Utah 538, 127 P. 275 (1912), 
a similar statute was discussed, § 4070, Comp. Laws 1907, 
which provided: 
No act committed by a person 
while in a state of voluntary 
intoxication is less criminal 
by reason of his having been in 
such condition. But whenever 
the actual existence of any 
particular purpose, motive, or 
intent is a necessary element 
to constitute any particular 
species or degree of crime, the 
jury may take into consideration 
the fact that the accused was 
intoxicated at the time, in de-
termining the purpose, motive or 
intent with which he committed 
the act. 
(127 P. at 278.) 
As is more thoroughly discussed in Point II of this 
brief, this court reversed a first degree murder conviction 
because of erroneous instructions based on this statute. As 
to the state of the law regarding the defense of voluntary 
intoxication, the court noted: 
Independently of a statute, it 
is the general rule that, while 
voluntary intoxication does not 
excuse crime, and is usually not 
a defense thereto, yet such con-
dition of the accused at the 
-11-
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time of the commission of the 
offense may be considered in de-
termining the purpose, motive, 
or intent where these elements 
become a material question of in-
quiry. And where one is charged 
with the commission of first 
degree murder, involving a 
specific intent to commit the 
crime of homicide, the accused 
may show, in order to reduce the 
degree of the offense, that he 
was in such a state of voluntary 
intoxication at the time of the 
commission of the crime as to be 
mentally incapable of forming 
the necessary intent, or of en-
tertaining or forming a design 
to take life, and as bearing on 
the existence or nonexistence of 
malice, and to explain and deter-
mine the accused's conduct with 
reference to the design, purpose, 
motive, and intent with which the 
act was committed. Extended notes 
to cases in 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1024, 
and 36 L.R.A. 470; 12 Cyc. 172, 
21 Cyc. 674, and cases there cited. 
This, in effect, is what the 
statute declares. 
(127 P. at 278-279.) 
In State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050, 
79 A.L.R. 878 (1931), a first degree murder conviction was re-
versed. The court found, among other things, that the instruc-
tions given on intoxication were insufficient. The court 
quoted with approval from 16 Corpus Juris: 
The rule that drunkenness is no 
defense does not apply to the 
full extent where a specific 
intent or motive is an essential 
element of the offense charged. 
-12-
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If at the time of the commission 
of such an offense the accused 
was by intoxication so entirely 
deprived of his reason that he 
did not have the mental capacity 
to entertain the necessary spe-
cific intent which is required 
to constitute the crime, he must 
necessarily be acquitted; and in 
like manner the fact of defen-
dant's drunkenness should be 
considered in determining the 
degree of the crime. This is so, 
not because drunkenness excuses 
crime but because if the mental 
status required by law to con-
stLtute crime be one of specific 
intent or of deliberation and 
premeditation, and drunkenness 
excludes the existence of such 
mental state, then the particular 
crLme charged has not in fact 
been committed. 
(2 P.Zd 1053-1054, emphasis 
added.) 
As discussed below, the evidence in the case at bar 
clearly showed that in fact appellant did not entertain the 
"intent" necessary to constitute the crime of aggravated 
robbery. 
While the question of what conduct constitutes the 
offense of aggravated robbery as defined by § 76-6-302 is of 
course governed by statute, it is still possible to gain an 
insight as to what constitutes an "intentional taking" by 
looking to the case law, much of which predates the statute in 
question. 
In People v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P. 492 (1895), 
-13-
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a conviction for robbery was reversed, as the trial court's 
instructions, based on the robbery statute, were incorrect. 
The instructions neglected to cover the animus furandi, or 
specific intent to steal, which is an element of robbery. Our 
court quoted with approval an Iowa case, State v. Hollyway, 
41 Iowa 200 (1878) : 
In robbery, as in larceny, it is 
essential that the taking of the 
goods be animo furandi. Unless 
the taking be with felonious in-
tent, it is not robbery. 
(39P. at494.) 
This rule is not only humane, but 
a contrary one would be opposed 
to all the principles which under-
lie human conduct as respects the 
bearing of individuals towards each 
other, and also as regards their 
position towards the state. 
(39 P. at 493-4.) 
Accord: State v. Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964). 
An interesting case, closely on point, is State v. 
Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 545 (1909). 
There, defendant had been convicted of forgery and uttering a 
forged instrument. Defendant did not deny the "acts" in ques-
tion, but asserted a defense based solely on insanity, i.e., 
mental defect. The prosecution's case was based solely on 
proof of the acts in question, 
without in any way attempting 
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to rebut or explain the evidence 
of insanity submitted on behalf 
of the defendant. 
(102 P. at 642.) 
The evidence of insanity (or lack of capacity) was 
substantial (although there was also substantial evidence that, 
at least at times, defendant acted rationally). Among the 
evidence going to insanity was the amateurishness of the 
forgery (cf. taking toilet paper and matches); the fact that 
some of defendant's ancestors were insane; the fact that de-
fendant had long been responsibly employed; that defendant 
felt the Japanese were the strongest race on earth, and that 
this was due to their diet, which consisted largely of rice; 
that defendant was obsessed with money and getting rich; that 
defendant lied about making large amounts of money; that when 
defendant's mother died, defendant was unconcerned, and had 
stated that he had hypnotized her and cured her; that defen-
dant did not take his prosecution seriously; that he neglected 
his lodge duties; and that he did not feel that he had done 
anything wrong. 
Defendant had called 14 witnesses, all of whom 
agreed that at the time of his act, defendant was mentally 
unbalanced, did not know the nature and quality of his act, 
and did not know or realize that his act was wrong. 
The jury was properly instructed, but nevertheless 
returned a verdict of guilty. 
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Our Supreme Court reversed, holding that the guilty 
verdict was not supported by the evidence, that the jury is 
not at liberty to disregard affirmative evidence, and that a 
jury verdict cannot be based on a mere presumption of sanity 
where defendant presents evidence of lack of capacity. The 
court noted: 
But if we assume that defendant 
intended to forge the checks, which 
he no doubt did, this is not alone 
sufficient to make an insane per-
son guilty of a crime. 
The true test is whether the de-
fendant, at the time of the commis-
sion of the offense, had the mental 
capacity to know that in doing the 
act he was doing wrong. 
(102 P. at 645.) 
The court held that the presumption of sanity had 
been entirely overcome, and the guilty verdict ignored or dis-
regarded the evidence, since the prosecution offered no evi-
dence of defendant's sanity. After defendant overcomes the 
presumption of his sanity with evidence, the prosecution must 
then prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The court noted: 
. . . whenever intent is an essen-
tial ingredient of the crime 
charged, this intent, to consti-
tute the act a crime, must be 
shown .. 
An insane person cannot be legally 
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guilty of a criminal intent. 
(102 P. at 645.) 
Since all of the evidence on insanity was in defen-
dant's favor, the court concluded that defendant had estab-
lished his defense as a "matter of law," and concluded: 
To convict a sane man who is 
innocent is depolorable, but to 
sentence a man.to the peniten-
tiary for a crime that he did 
not have the mental capacity to 
commit would be intolerable. 
(102 P. at 646.) 
In State v. Hartley, 16 Utah 2d 123, 396 P.2d 749 
(1964), a conviction of second degree burglary was affirmed, 
but the court noted that voluntary intoxication can negate 
the specific intent to commit larceny, which is an essential 
element to second degree burglary (as well as robbery and 
aggeavated robbery). The issue, once raised, is for the jury. 
In State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931), 
86 Utah 192, 40 P.2d 961 (1935), the conviction of first 
degree murder resulting from defendant's first trial was re-
versed on several grounds. The evidence showed that defendant 
and his wife had been fighting, that defendant purchased a 
knife, pistol, and ammunition, and that defendant had shot 
and killed his ''ife, her mother, and the mother's husband. 
The court held, inter alia, that the presumption of sanity 
obtains until either defendant or the prosecution produces 
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"some evidence" of insanity, When evidence of insanity is 
introduced, the presumption "disappears" and the jury must 
determine the issue of sanity solely on the evidence, without 
regard to the presumption. It is for the trial judge, not the 
jury, to determine if the evidence raises the issue of sanity 
(i.e., it is a question of law), but only "some evidence" is 
required before the issue must be sent to the jury. If there 
exists a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity, he is en-
titled to an acquittal, but insanity excuses only where it 
renders defendant "irresponsible" or partly so. 
In State v. Dewey, 41 Utah 538, 127 P. 275 (1912), 
supra, defendant was both intoxicated and jealous, as to his 
wife's affections. The wife determined to leave him. She 
took a hotel room. Defendant went to the room, in an intoxi-
cated state, with a pistol. It was apparently his intention 
to kill his wife and himself. He was quite loud. He threat-
ened both his wife and another hotel guest and threatened to 
kill "any cops" who entered the room. The police were sum-
moned. Three officers arrived at the room, and as they en-
tered, one asked a question to the effect of, "What is the 
trouble?" Defendant, who had concealed his pistol behind his 
leg, replied to the effect that there was "no trouble," and 
immediately drew the pistol and shot the lead officer in the 
chest. He died shortly thereafter. 
The evidence at trial indicated that defendant had 
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suffered from delerium tremens some six months earlier, Both 
expert and lay witnesses' testimony as to defendant's alec-
holic insanity was conflicting. 
As is discussed more completely in Point II of this 
brief, this court held that the evidence was sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict of guilty of murder in the first 
degree, but nevertheless reversed the conviction because the 
trial court refused to give defendant's requested instructions. 
The court, in Dewey, noted that Camp. Laws 1907 
§ 4856 placed the burden of production of evidence of justifi-
cation or excuse on defendant, 
. . . but he is not required to 
establish the justification or 
excuse by a preponderance of the 
evidence to avail himself of that 
defense. 
(127 P. at 280.) 
Defendant has only to create a reasonable doubt. The prosecu-
tion must still prove all the elements in issue, including 
mental capacity, beyond a reasonable doubt. (Accord: State 
v. Vacos, 40 Utah 169, 120 P. 497 (1911).) 
With this outline of the law before us, let us now 
look to the evidence that was produced at the trial of the 
instant case. 
The State's first witness was Mr. Von W. Johnston. 
In addition to those facts previously recited, he testified 
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in cross-examination that appellant's eyes looked "unusual" 
(Tr. 8), that he had a "blank stare" (Tr. 8), that he appeared 
"abnormal" (Tr. 9), and "incoherent," "in one sense of the 
word" CI'r, 9). Mr. Johnston testified that it was his impres-
sion that appellant "did not have his senses," and that he 
"was not even in the same world as us" (Tr. 9). He felt that 
appellant was in a "very emotional and mental state" (Tr. 9). 
Appellant never pointed his revolver at Mr. Johnston (Tr. 10), 
and seemed very polite, and thanked Mr. Johnston for the toilet 
paper and matches (Tr. 5, 10), and shook his hand before leav-
ing (Tr. 5). Mr. Johnston testified that appellant seemed 
"uncoordinated" as he left (Tr. 10), and that he didn't keep 
Mrs. Johnston constantly in his sight, as an "ordinary robber" 
would be expected to do (Tr. 11). 
On redirect examination, Mr. Johnston was asked by 
the prosecuting attorney: 
Q: You said he [appellant] was 
very abnormal in one sense 
of the word. ~~at was that 
sense of the word? 
A: Well, he looked to me as if 
he had been on dope. This 
is the first thing that come 
into my mind, that the man 
was on dope, and he hasn't 
got his faculties in his 
mind, and that he might be 
an irrational person that 
could do anything, you 
know 
(Tr. 12,) 
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After a short recross-examination, the prosecuting 
attorney questioned Mr. Johnston as to appellant's "physical 
ability to handle himself, his ability to stand and to walk 
and to talk, to ask questions [ . ] " (Tr. 15) . The prosecutor 
asked: 
Q: Well, looking back--going 
on what you observed about 
the defendant today and at 
the preliminary hearing, 
and thinking back to Febru-
ary 22nd--we've gone over 
this before but I think we 
need to verify this--his 
ability to walk, his ability 
to stand or move around, 
some of the things that 
you've observed--is there 
any difference [between 
appellant's appearance at 
trial and on the morning of 
the incident]? 
A: Yes. I've observed that the 
night that he come to my 
house--! don't think that 
he was drunk in that manner, 
but I do think--I still 
think that he acted like a 
person that was on dope. Be-
cause he just had a blank 
stare, which he doesn't have 
today. And I haven't heard 
him talk today so I don't 
know his normal voice. In 
fact, I never heard the man 
talk except that night (Tr. 
15,16). 
The State's next witness was Hazel Lorraine Johnston, 
Hr. Jonston's wife. On direct examination she stated that 
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"[Appellant] seemed to be in a daze, sort of starry-eyed. 
His eyes didn;t have any expression in them" (Tr. 19). She 
further testified on cross-examination that appellant's tone 
of voice on the night in question was "co=anding," like "a 
sergeant or somebody giving orders, or someone in the army[.]" 
(Tr. 25). 
asked: 
On redirect examination the prosecuting attorney 
Q: Relating to the defendant, 
in your observation of his 
senses in his ability to 
perform, would you tell the 
Court what you--or the jury 
what you observed? Did he 
have his senses in your 
opinion? 
A: Well, I don't think it was 
so much the way he acted 
that we thought, you know, 
there was something--it was 
what he asked for--to come 
into someone's horne and ask 
for toilet paper and matches. 
That's just got to be some-
thing wrong. That was more 
the reason why I thought 
there had to be something 
wrong (Tr. 26). 
To quickly su=arize the evidence to this point, 
both of the victims of the crime testified that "something Has 
wrong" with appellant's mental state. He seemed to be "on 
dope" (Tr. 12). They reached this conclusion because of what 
appellant asked for (Tr. 26), because of his unusual blank 
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stares, and his incoherent, drugged appearance (see Tr. 8,9, 
10,12,15,16,19,22,26,27,28,29). 
The next witness in the case was Officer Larry 
Prince of the East Carbon City Police Department (Tr. 29). He 
testified that he had been involved in the high-speed chase of 
appellant. During the chase, the officer's vehicle "reached 
speeds of over a hundred--probably close to 110 [miles per 
hour]" (Tr. 30). 
The officer testified that appellant almost caused 
a head-on collision '"ith another police car (Tr. 32); that he 
tried to disable yet another police car by slamming on his 
brakes to cause a rear-end collision and by ramming the same 
car's right front (fender) in a swerving maneuver (Tr. 33). 
Finally, appellant stopped his vehicle about a mile 
short of a roadblock which had been set up (Tr. 34). Officer 
Prince testified that after appellant had stopped his vehicle, 
Officer Penrod exited his car, 
using his door as cover. I posi-
tioned my car to the left rear of 
Officer Penrod's car. I exited 
my car using my door as cover. 
We ordered the subject out of the 
car, which he did. And he was 
standing there with the--a weapon 
in his hand, waving it with the 
barrel down. And Officer Penrod 
told him several times to put it 
down. And at one time he said: 
'Put the gun down and don't do 
anything stupid.' And finally he 
did put the gun down. Officer 
Penrod and Sheriff Passic carne up 
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and subdued the subject. And I 
came up and I grabbed the weapon 
at that time. (Tr. 34.) 
On cross-examination the officer testified that 
appellant had not pointed his gun at him (the officer) while 
appellant had been standing in the road (Tr. 36) . Further, the 
officer testified that he agreed with Mr. Johnston's testimony 
that appellant was, at the time of the incident, "very abnormal," 
that appellant's eyes were "very unusual," and that appellant 
"had a blank stare," and that appellant was in a "very emotion-
al and mental state that night," that he was "incoherent," 
that "he didn't even have his senses," and that it "didn't even 
seem that [appellant] was in the same world as us." (See Tr. 
37,38.) 
The officer also testified that v1hile he could not 
detect the smell of alcohol on appellant, he had reason to be-
lieve that appellant was under the influence of alcohol, "to 
the point that [appellant] had to submit to a blood test[.]" 
The officer stated that the blood test showed appellant's 
blood concentration of alcohol to be .24%, three times the 
statutory presumption for driving under the influence (Tr. 41, 
42). 
Finally, Officer Prince was asked, and replied to, 
the following: 
Q: All of these that you agreed 
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to: Eyes unusual, blank 
stare, very abnormal, in-
coherent, not even have his 
senses, not in the same 
v1orld as us, emotional and 
in a mental state--and you 
don't say that he's any of 
them now, do you, as you 
sit and look at him? 
A: No, sir. (Tr. 43.) 
Officer Larry Penrod and Norman Vuksinick also testi-
fied for the State. Their testimony was corroborative of that 
of Officer Prince. 
At this point, it should be noted that the State's 
case raised sufficient evidence to defeat any presumption of 
appellant's sanity, and therefore placed the burden on the 
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only that appel-
lant had the requisite "intentional" state of mind, but also 
that he had the requisite "capacity" to commit a crime. (State 
v. Bro>vn, supra; State v. Green, supra; State v. Dewey, supra; 
State v. Vacos, supra; §§ 76-6-301, 76-6-302, 76-2-103, 
76-2-305, 76-2-306.) 
The State failed to sustain this burden. It pre-
sented absolutely no evidence to the effect that appellant had 
the requisite capacity or intent. Therefore, on this basis 
alone, appellant's conviction must be reversed. 
The case for the defense produced still more evi-
dence showing that appellant lacked the requisite intent and 
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capacity. 
Appellant called two witnesses 01r. Marvin Dalton 
and Hr. Gary Grako) who testified as to his general reputation 
in the community as a nonviolent person (see Tr. 62-65). 
Appellant testified in his own behalf. He stated 
that he did not remember the events of the night in question 
(Tr. 67). He also testified that he received a head injury in 
1974, which left a scar on the left rear area of his head 
(Tr. 68, note that this is an external scar, not the "cortical 
scar" which was revealed by the electroencephalogram, and which 
is discussed further below) . He further testified that he had 
been taking medication (Colbenemid and Benemid) daily for gout, 
for about five years (Tr. 75). 
As to the day of the events in question, appellant 
testified that the last thing he remembered was being at the 
Eagle's Lodge at about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. (Tr. 69,70,79). He 
recalled having roughly five drinks, blended whiskey mixed 
with water (Tr. 70). The next thing he remembered was waking 
in a jail cell (Tr. 71). Appellant could not recall any of 
the acts, as to the alleged robbery, or as to the high-speed 
chase with the police (Tr. 71,77). 
He stated that he had never had a prior "problem" 
from taking his medication and drinking at the same time 
(Tr. 78), although he had in fact taken the drugs and drank 
simultaneously before (Tr. 79). 
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On redirect examination, appellant stated that he 
had never behaved before in the manner which he acted on the 
night in question (Tr. 81), even though he had been intoxi-
cated before. 
Appellant's next witness was Dr. Lincoln Clark, a 
physician and psychiatrist. Dr. Clark is a graduate of the 
Harvard Medical School (Tr. 83). He was a resident at the 
Massachusetts Medical Hospital in Boston for three years in 
internal medicine (Tr. 83). He then spent three years as a 
resident at the !1assachusetts General Hospital in psychiatry 
(Tr. 83). He then studied neurology in Great Britain's Hospi-
tal Training Center while attending the University of London 
(Tr. 83). He then returned to Boston where he did research 
as a junior medical faculty member (Tr. 83). After serving 
two years as a military psychiatrist in Germany, he came to 
Utah, where he became a full-time member of the faculty of the 
College of Medicine at the University of Utah (Tr. 83,84). 
He is presently teaching at the College of Medicine, where he 
is a full professor of psychology and pharmacology (Tr. 84). 
His field of interest is the area of drug effects and human 
behavior (Tr. 84). He is also currently a consultant to the 
State of Wyoming as a forensic psychiatrist, and to the Utah 
State Training School of American Fork (Tr. 84). At this 
latter institution alone Dr. Clark takes care of some 900 
nsychiatric and behavior problems, and some 900 brain damage 
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rehabilitated individuals (Tr. 84). At the College of Medi-
cine he teaches, among other things, the block of classes that 
deals with drug abuse and alcoholism in the pharmacology 
courses. This block is taught in all medical schools (Tr. 85). 
Finally, based on his professional integrity, Dr. Clark testi-
fied as a witness without compensation from appellant or appel-
lant's counsel (Tr. 108,109). 
Dr. Clark testified that it was his opinion that 
during the incident in question appellant 
. . . was in a period of severe 
impairment of his usual mental 
faculties; and that there is a 
disorganized, chaotic quality to 
his behavior, if not a bizarre 
quality[,] evidenced throughout 
this whole story. And on [my] 
basic experience it is the 
description of a behavior of 
an individual who has impairment 
because of brain disfunction 
(sic) from some cause. 
Now, in analyzing this case the 
biggest question is what was 
the nature of this cause, what 
made this episode of intoxica-
tion different from previous 
ones? Because the subject is 
not unused to the effects of 
alcohol. He knows generally what 
to expect from it. But this epi-
sode had a quality and led to 
behaviors that are tota~t of 
character w~th this indiv~dual. 
Now, given a situation like this, 
one would try to obtain what in-
formation one can in terms of 
what was different. Some of the 
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possibilities are that the 
amount of alcohol, assuming 
alcohol is a critical factor--
that his exposure was very much 
more massive or heavy than the 
experiences before. Now, the 
subject does not recall his 
drinking as being excessive--
more excessive than usual. He 
can recall drinking comparable 
amounts without this happening. 
The other possibility is he could 
have used a beverage that he was 
not familiar with or not as used 
to, or there was more toxic in 
this substance (sic) . 
For example, in this instance 
the subject told me that he re-
calls drinking tequila, which is 
not an ordinary beverage with 
him. And he would recall in 
Vietnam he would become severely 
intoxicated on tequila. Tequila 
is a beverage which has its 
more than its usual share of in-
toxicating substances other than 
alcohol. (sic) 
And the other possibility is 
that someone added some other 
drug . . (Tr. 88,89, emphasis 
added.) 
Dr. Clark testified specifically about the drug 
Benemid, and the special significance of the fact that appel-
lant has taken the drug daily for over five years. 
Benemid is a substance that is 
used for the treatment of gout. 
It exercises its action by 
blocking the kidneys, blocks the 
transport of acids and other com-
pounds. In other words, if there 
was toxic materials entering his 
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Now, finally, the key point, I 
think here, is that this man had 
a head injury to the left side of 
his head in 1974. Because of the 
similarity of the bizarre quality 
of his behavior in this occasion, 
I was concerned that it might 
represent the occurrence of a 
form of epilepsy that can be 
adduced bt alcohol and by alcohol 
withdrawa . And that is the rea-
son for sending him for an elec-
troencephalogram. The findings 
of that electroencephalogram were 
surprising and I think extremely 
relevant to this case. (Tr. 90, 
91, emphasis added.) 
A graph recording of the electroencephalogram was 
then introduced into evidence. Dr. Clark then proceeded to 
show the jury the "spikes " which represented electrical brain 
activity from appellant's temporal lobe (Tr. 91,92). Dr. Clark 
continued: 
The significance of that is that 
the temnoral lobe is the part of 
zour brain that is involved in 
~ntegrat~ng the complex behav~ors. 
It is also a cr~t~cal factor ~n 
remember~ng what happens. Arid 
th~s ~s a man now Ln a normar-
state, not under the ~nfluence 
of drugs, who has a spLke dLs-
charge, a temporal lobe focus 
that LS firing at regular inter-
vals. The presumption is that 
he has a cortical scar secondarv 
to the braLn LnJury Ln 19/4. -
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Now, the condition of alcohol 
withdrawal, because alcohol is 
a repressive with blood activity, 
when it is being excreted, there 
is a release; and as you know, 
people withdrawing from alcohol 
can have seizures. Now, the lo-
cation of th~s--he would not 
necessarily have a generalized 
convulsion, but have ps¥chomotive 
seizures, that is assoc~ated w~th 
disorganized behavior often in a 
dream-l~ke state ~n wh~ch the 
~nd~v~dual can act in a bizarre 
fashion but fragments of his 
normal behavior would be present 
such as walking and so forth. 
So in brief, my assumption is 
that this man has indeed a temoo-
ral lobe focus that he was not 
aware of that ~s probably related 
to the injury in '74. It's veri 
common that this not show ~tsel 
for some ears after in"ur ; be-
cause t e scar forms gradua t 
and usually several years w~l 
elapse before this becomes si~ni­
ficant. Arid ~t may never, ~n eed, 
become frontally significant, had 
he not been exposed to the lasting 
effects of alcohol intoxication 
and whatever else may have been 
involved in that eoisode. 
(Tr. 92,93, emphasis added.) 
Dr. Clark and appellant's counsel then went through 
the following colloquy: 
Q Now, do you have an opinion, 
Doctor, as to whether or not 
it would be consistent with 
his going through the acts 
that have been testified to 
by the officers and the 
Johnstons, and still because 
of the effects that you've 
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described to the jury--that 
the defendant would not in 
fact remember doing them? 
A He would not remember, no. 
Q And would there at least be 
a reasonable doubt that 
under the circumstances he 
could not form a specific 
intent to perform these 
crimes of robbery and aggra-
vated robbery? 
A Yes. I think there would 
be a reasonable doubt. 
Q And would it be reasonable 
that he would not have a 
conscious objective or de-
sire to engage in that 
particular conduct or any 
particular conduct or cause 
any particular result? 
A Yes. 
Q And was in your oplnlon the 
information that you have 
heard in court and what in-
formation the defendant gave 
you about his past history, 
et cetera, in arriving at 
the opinion--do you have an 
opinion as to whether or not 
you believe the witness was 
telling you the truth-- or 
the defendant was telling 
you the truth when he gave 
you his background informa-
tion? 
A Yes. (Tr. 93.) 
Q . Would it be consistent 
with your opinion that he 
could be taking medicine on 
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previous occasions, a large 
amount of alcohol at the 
same time on previous occa-
sions, and still not go into 
one of these 
A Oh, yes. 
Q What do you call them --
like a seizure from amnesia? 
A Associated disorganized be-
havior. 
Q And if he ordinarily drank 
Canadian Club or blended 
bourbon, but on this occa-
sion he had that plus 
tequila, could they be 
reasonably one of the causes 
that would --
A Yes. It could be the total 
quantity involved as well as 
the possibility of additional 
substances of beverages of a 
toxic effect, yes. 
Q And do you have an op~n~on 
as to whether or not the de-
fendant is in any way feign-
ing his responsibility by 
saying: "I don't remember 
anything from 9:00 or 9:30 
on until the next morning?" 
A Yes. I do have an opinion. 
Q And what is that opinion? 
A I believe he is telling the 
truth. 
Q And you believe that under 
the circumstances he could 
not form the specific intent 
necessary for the conviction 
of the crime? 
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A That's correct. (Tr. 94, 
95.) 
On cross-examination, Dr. Clark maintained, as to 
appellant's testimony, that he remembered nothing of the inci-
dent, 
I think the description of what 
occurred is . . . characteristic 
of a person who has had an organic 
brain syndrome, associated with 
epilepsy, of organic diffusion[,] 
to have this type of global memory 
loss. It's 6uite characteristic. 
(Tr. 97, emp asis added.) 
On further cross-examination, Dr. Clark explained in 
more detail the nature of the epileptic seizure that appellant ·~as 
subject to on the night in question. 
[Epileptics] can become very dis-
organized on temporal lobe sei-
zures. That's the expression, 
is chaotic [sic]. It's not a 
convulsion--is probably what 
you're thinking about [sic]. 
But there's any variance of epi-
lepsy . And where some 
lesion is located, produces a 
certain type of abnormal behavior 
[sic]. It is evident in disruo-
tion of the normal ability to 
carry out organized behavior. 
But there may be fragments of 
automatic old behavior patterns. 
walking, driving a car, on making 
old familiar resoonses. But the 
important thing is the chaining-
together of these lnto organized 
senslble patterns, ~,<7hlch can be 
dlsruptlve. (Tr. 101, emphasis 
added.) 
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On redirect examination, Dr. Clark was asked: 
Q What is your opLnLon rela-
tive to the order: "Give 
me your toilet paper and 
matches?" 
A I don't know. Except --
and I can only speculate 
this man spent three years 
in combat in Vietnam. He 
was a sergeant and a squad 
leader. One of the compo-
nents of C-Rations that's 
given-- there's a kind of 
dessert and a can of fruit 
and cigarettes, matches, 
and toilet paper -- given 
in addition to their regular 
can of beans or whatever. 
And matches and toilet 
paper are very important, 
as is pointed out in Viet-
nam. You can't go to the 
local IGA to get your toilet 
paper. So it's perfectly 
possible, and it happens in 
temporal lobe seizures, that 
he had digressed to a dream-
like state and was reacting, 
as he once did, as [if] he 
was in a totally different 
situation. So I think the 
main association I could 
draw from him and from this 
episode, was he was in Viet-
nam and then to the con-
tents of the C-Ration, this 
little packet of toilet 
paper and matches. And he 
wanted toilet paper and 
matches. This is the only 
hypothesis I could develop 
about why this strange think-
ing would come into his mind. 
But it is known that under 
the influence of alcohol, 
and during the periods of 
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abnormal discharge of the 
temporal lobe, there can 
be old memories evoked. 
People will react in terms 
of these old memories. 
They'll go back to these 
other places in their memo-
ries. This happens when 
people are recovering from 
anesthesia. They'll feel 
they're back in some loca-
tion and old memories will 
come back to them. So I 
think this man was function-
ing at a disorganized, primi-
tive level. 
Q Would that be consistent 
with reasonableness, when 
the Johnstons testified as 
if he was in full command, 
giving directions to Mrs. 
Johnston to go to the right 
and things such as that? 
A Hell, again, I think this man 
has been in a position of 
command, that giving orders 
would be habitual as an army 
sergeant. Also organizing 
other fragments of his char-
acter, with his habitual 
politeness, which came out --
about his presence in this 
otherwise chaotic picture. 
He was acting in this bizarre 
way and then at the same time 
politeness. This is a chaotic 
mixture of old behaviors and 
character traits, politeness, 
and having been an army ser-
geant, mixed in with this 
strange mixture of activities. 
Q And would that also be your 
opinion relative to the fact 
that he appeared to the 
officers to be driving all 
right, walking all right, 
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even though his blood 
alcohol oroved to be as 
great as.it was? 
A Yes. I think that this 
man's blood alcohol is in 
a level that is high, but 
in an individual who 
drinks regularly, he 
could have enough toler-
ance not to show the motor 
impairment, the slurred 
speech, the incoordination. 
That's why I think parti-
cularly there was an addi-
tional element going on, 
and I think that additional 
element is reflected in 
this tracing. (Indicat-
ing [the spikes on the 
electroencephalogram).) 
And it is quite consistent 
with the behavior given. 
Under the statutes and case law cited above, it is 
clear that the jury's guilty verdict of the count of aggravated 
robbery is not supported by the evidence. 
It is of some significance that the jury acquitted 
appellant of the count charging aggravated assault against 
Officer Norman Vuksinick. It is uncontradicted that appellant 
committed the acts therein charged. That is, he used his ve-
hicle in a manner calculated to wreck the officer's car, while 
the officer was still in it. Such an act is certainly "such 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily in-
jury[,)" as defined by § 76-5-103 (_b) Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). 
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In State v. Howell, 545 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1976), this 
court held that under this section of the aggravated robbery 
statute, only a general intent, or awareness of what is done, 
is sufficient to satisfy the mental element of the offense. 
It would seem that the jury's verdict, in acquitting appellant 
of aggravated assault, represents a finding that appellant in 
fact lacked the requisite mental capacity. 
Nevertheless, the jury found that appellant had the 
mental capacity to act "intentionally" as to the alleged aggra-
vated robbery. As was discussed above, the aggravated robbery 
statute, § 76-6-302 Utah Code Annotated (1953), requires a 
specific larcenous intent. (Also see State v. Howell, supra, 
as to the "specific intent" requirement where the statute re-
quires an "intentional" act.) 
For the jury to find appellant innocent of an offense 
that requires only a general intent, while convicting him of 
an offense that requires a specific intent, is clearly incon-
sistent. It serves to illustrate that the jury's verdict of 
guilty of aggravated robbery is in conflict with the evidence. 
From the evidence of the State's case, the issue of 
appellant's capacity was raised, and the presumption of capa-
city was defeated. Indeed, it is arguable that the State's 
case itself raised a reasonable doubt whether appellant enter-
tained an "intentional" state of mind. 
The evidence produced for the defense, especially 
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the testimony of Dr, Clark, was conclusive that appellant 
lacked an "intentional" state of mind. It was also conclusive 
that appellant suffered from a "mental disease or defect" that 
resulted in his lacking "substantial capacity either to appre-
ciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law." He was clearly entitled to 
an acquittal under the defense provided by § 76-2-305. 
Even if it is assumed that appellant's mental con-
dition was one of "voluntary intoxication," the evidence still 
clearly shows a lack of the "intentional" mental element re-
quired. Therefore, under § 76-2-306, appellant would be simi-
larly entitled to an acquittal. 
Unquestionably, the evidence raised at least a rea-
sonable doubt as to whether appellant had the required culp-
able mental element. It is of great significance that the 
prosecution in no way even attempted to prove, by its own evi-
dence, that appellant had the "intentional" state of mind. 
The State's case was based on proof of the acts, and that 
alone is not sufficient. 
The case of State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641, 
24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 545 (1909), supra, seems controlling here. 
Appellant presented substantial, indeed conclusive, 
evidence of lack of capacity, which the prosecution in no way 
rebutted. The prosecution did not even attempt to rebut it. 
While the jury is indeed the trier of fact, it may 
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not disregard affirmative evidence. Nor may a jury base a 
guilty verdict on a mere presumption of sanity where there is 
affirmative evidence that the defendant lac~ed mental capacity. 
Therefore, appellant's conviction for aggravated robbery must 
be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY. 
Appellant's proposed Instruction Number 3 stated: 
Voluntary intoxication is an 
absolute defense to a crime 
charged where such intoxication 
negates the existence of the 
mental state required as an ele-
ment of said crime. 
Therefore, should you find that 
the defendant was intoxicated at 
the time the alleged acts occurred, 
as a result of the consumption of 
alcohol or drugs or both, you must 
determine whether his intoxication 
was of a degree which would negate 
the existence of the mental state 
required as an element of the 
offenses charged against the de-
fendant. 
In this case, the defendant has 
been charged with three offenses 
and all three offenses require 
that the defendant have acted in-
tentionally or willfully. Such 
a mental state is defined at law 
as being where it is one's con-
scious objective or desire to 
engage in a particular conduct or 
cause a particular result. Should 
you find that the defendant was, 
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as a result of his intoxication, 
unable to form the necessary 
intent to engage in unlawful 
conduct or cause unlawful re-
sults, you must find him not 
guilty. 
The trial court felt that it had given the instruc-
tion in substance in its Instruction Number 8, which stated: 
Our law provides that 'no act 
committed by a person while in 
a state of voluntary intoxication 
is less criminal by reason of his 
having been in such condition.' 
This means that such a condition, 
if shown by the evidence to have 
existed in the defendant at the 
time when allegedly he committed 
the crime charged, is not of it-
self a defense. It may throw 
light on the occurrence and aid 
you in determining what took place; 
but when a person in a state of 
intoxication, voluntarily produced 
in himself, commits a crime, the 
law does not permit him to use his 
own vice as a shelter against the 
normal, legal consequences of his 
conduct. 
However, when the existence of any 
particular motive, purpose or in-
tent is a necessary element to 
constitute a particular kind or 
degree of crime the jury, in deter-
mining whether or not such motive, 
purpose or intent existed in the 
mind of the accused, must take 
into consideration the evidence 
offered to prove that the accused 
was intoxicated at the time when 
the crime allegedly was committed. 
This fact requires an inquiry into 
the state of mind under which the 
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defendant committed the act 
charged, if he did commit it. 
In pursuing that inquiry, it is 
proper to consider whether he 
was intoxicated at the time of 
the alleged offense. The weight 
to be given the evidence on that 
question and the significance to 
attach to it, in relation to all 
the other evidence, are exclu-
sively within your province. 
The Court's instruction erroneously construes the 
voluntary intoxication statute, § 76-2-306 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) . It should be noted that the statute is found in Part 
of Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code. The title of Chapter 2 is 
"PRINCIPLES OF CRH1INAL RESPONSIBILITY," and the title of Part 
is "Defenses to Criminal Responsibility." 
The statute states: 
76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication.--
Voluntary intoxication shall not be 
a defense to a criminal charge un-
less such intoxication negates the 
existence of the mental state which 
is an element of the offense; how-
ever, if recklessness or criminal 
negligence establishes an element 
of an offense and the actor is un-
aware of the risk because of volun-
tary intoxication, his unawareness 
is immaterial in a prosecution for 
that offense. (Emphasis added.) 
Clearly, when the offense charged requires an "in-
tentional" mental state, and intoxication negates the exis-
tence of such a state, then such intoxication is, of itself, 
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an absolute defense. See State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 
2 P.2d 1050, 79 A.L.R. 878 (1931), cited supra in Point I. 
This court therein stated tha~ when one is so intoxicated that 
he does not entertain the requisite mental capacity for the 
offense charged, "he must necessarily be acquitted." (2 P.2d 
at 1054, emphasis added.) 
The trial court's instruction specifically states 
that such intoxication is not a defense. It quotes, and is 
obviously based upon, an old statute dealing with voluntary 
intoxication (Section 7910, Penal Code, Comp. Laws Utah 1917). 
It charged the jury that appellant's intoxication "may throw 
light on the occurrence and aid you in determining what took 
place;" but that appellant cannot "use his own vice as a shel-
ter against the normal, legal consequences of his conduct." 
The instruction misstates the law, and misled the 
jury, to the prejudice of appellant's case. It merely states 
that intoxication is to be taken "into consideration" on 
whether or not a "motive, purpose or intent existed in the 
mind of the accused." It does not define "intent," nor did it 
refer to the definition of "intentional" to be found elsewhere 
in the court's instructions. It did not refer, even obliquely, 
to the fact that if appellant's intoxication was such that it 
negated an "intentional" state of mind, he must be acquitted. 
The given instruction further invited the jury to 
speculate on the issue, by stating the significance to be 
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given the evidence in this regard was "exclusively within [the 
jury's] province. 
Appellant's proposed Instruction Number 3 was there-
fore not given in substance by the trial court. Appellant's 
proposed instruction was based on the current Utah statutory 
provisions dealing with subject. It correctly states that vol-
untary intoxication may be an absolute defense, and it gave 
clear, concrete guidance as to how the question of intoxication 
relates to the issue of an "intentional" state of mind. The 
instruction should have been given. Since it was not, the jury 
may well have improperly applied an erroneous construction of 
the law to the facts, resulting in appellant's conviction for 
a crime that he did not have the capacity to commit. 
Appellant offered three other instructions on the 
issue of the mental elements to offenses charged. Appellant's 
proposed Instruction Number 4 stated: 
When a person commits an act with-
out being conscious thereof, he 
does not thereby commit a crime 
even though such an act would con-
stitute a crime if committed by a 
person when conscious. The state 
of unconsciousness to which I re-
fer in this instruction is a con-
dition experienced by a person 
normally sane, wherein there is no 
functioning of the conscious mind, 
and the person's acts are con-
trolled by the subconscious mind. 
An example of the type of uncon-
sciousness to which this instruc-
tion refers is where a person 
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performs acts while under invol-
untary intoxication produced by 
alcohol or drugs. 
Involuntary intoxication is in-
toxication forced upon a person 
or intoxication incurred from 
one's not knowing of the nature 
of the substance ingested or 
knowing of its effect when com-
bined with another substance. 
Should you find that defendant 
was under involuntary intoxica-
tion to the extent that there was 
no functioning of the conscious 
mind at the time of the alleged 
criminal acts, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. 
Proposed Instruction Number 6 stated: 
For every crime with which the 
defendant is charged in this 
case, there must not only be un-
lawful acts, but also there must 
be unlawful intents, and the acts 
and intents must happen at the 
very same instance. 
If you should find beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the alleged 
unlawful acts occurred, you still 
may not find the defendant guilty 
of any offenses charged until and 
unless you are convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt the alleged un-
lawful intents also occurred, and 
at the very same instance with 
the alleged unlawful acts. 
In determining the existence of 
the alleged unlawful intents, you 
may consider the combination of 
the effects of alcohol, drugs, 
and mental disorders on the de-
fendant's mind at the time of the 
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alleged unlawful acts. 
For example, even if you should 
find there initially v7as volun-
tary intoxication on the part of 
the defendant, if you have rea-
sonable doubt that the effects 
of alcohol, drugs, mental dis-
orders or any combination thereof 
caused the absence of the neces-
sary unlawful intents, as else-
where in these instructions were 
specifically discussed, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty. 
Proposed Instruction Number 7 stated: 
The theory of the defense in this 
case is that although the defen-
dant did in fact perform the un-
lawful acts complained of, he did 
not possess the necessary unlawful 
intents for his conscious objec-
tives or desires to engage in the 
particular conduct or cause the 
particular results. 
In support of this theory, the de-
fendant contends a combination of 
the influence of alcohol, drugs 
and mental disorders prevented 
the existence of the necessary 
unlawful intents or even memories 
of those acts. 
The defendant has no burden of proof 
whatsoever and surely does not have 
to convince you beyond a reasonable 
doubt as to the absence of such un-
lawful intents. 
On the contrary, the State has the 
burden of proof to convince you be-
yond a reasonable doubt as to the 
presence of such unlawful intents. 
Therefore, if you have a reasonable 
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doubt as to the presence or 
absence of the necessary unlaw-
ful intents at the very same 
instance as the necessary un-
lawful acts, it is your duty 
to find the defendant not guilty. 
The trial court declined to give these instructions, 
or any part of them. Rather, the court gave two instructions 
on the issue of the requisite mental state. The court's In-
struction Number 6 stated: 
No person is guilty of an 
offense unless his conduct is 
prohibited by law and he acts 
intentionally or knowingly with 
respect to each element of the 
offense as defined for you by 
these instructions. It does 
not require a specific intent to 
violate the law but merely an 
intent to engage in the acts or 
conduct that constitute the ele-
ments of the offense. 
Therefore, if you find that the 
mental condition of the defen-
dant at the times of the alleged 
offenses was such that he did 
not have the intent as that term 
has been defined for you in 
these instructions to perform 
the acts or conduct required 
for the commission of the offense 
charged, or if you entertain a 
reasonable doubt thereof, then 
vou should find the defendant not 
guilty of the crimes charged. 
Instruction Number 7 stated: 
You are instructed that under the 
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Utah law a person engages in con-
duct intentionally with respect 
to the nature of his conduct or 
to a result of his conduct when 
it is his conscience objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct 
or cause the result. 
The given instructions are somewhat inconsistent and 
misleading. Number 6 stated that "a specific intent to violate 
the law" is not required, and of course this is true. But the 
instruction then states that a mere "intent to engage in the 
acts or conduct" is sufficient for a conviction. This is not 
the case for an offense that requires an "intentional" state of 
mind, and obviously this part of Instruction Number 6 conflicts 
with Instruction Number 7. 
In State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931), 
86 Utah 192, 40 P.2d 961 (1935), the court, quoting from Jensen 
v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 360, 270 P. 349 (1927), stated: 
. . . that the g~v~ng of incon-
sistent instructions is error and 
sufficient ground for a reversal 
of the judgment, because, after 
verdict, it cannot be told which 
instruction was followed by the 
jury, or what influence the erro-
neous instruction had on their 
deliberations. (6 P.2d at 
183-4.) 
While appellant concedes that Instruction Number 7 
correctly gives the statutory definition of "intentional." it 
was nevertheless insufficient to cure the error in Instruction 
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Number 6. Further, while it correctly states the abstract 
definition, it gave the jury no guidance in applying that 
definition to the facts of the case. 
In State v. Dewey, 41 Utah 538, 127 P. 275 (_1912), 
cited supra in Point I, this court reversed a conviction of 
first degree murder. The court found that the evidence sup-
ported the jury's verdict, and that the instructions given 
were correct abstract statements of the law. Nevertheless, 
the court reversed, holding such instructions were insufficient 
when the defendant had requested instructions relating the 
specific facts of the case to the law. The court noted that 
the given instruction in question was well stated in the ab-
stract, 
But the duty of the court is not 
always discharged by merely giving 
the jury an abstract and lexical 
definition of a thing, as was done 
here. Litigants are entitled to 
have the court declare the law 
applicable to the particular facts 
of the case; to charge concretely, 
not abstractly. A charge which 
applies the law to the facts of 
the case, and states to the jury 
the crucial question or questions 
involved, which they, upon the 
evidence, must answer, is much 
more helpful to them, and conduces 
far more to a just administration 
of the law, than mere abstract 
propositions of law, dissertations 
on sound theories, or lexical defi-
nitions of things, concerning the 
application of which the jury are 
left in doubt or allowed to make 
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as they might think proper .... 
Tne general and abstract charge as 
here given applies as well to dif-
ferent facts of a hundred or more 
• cases as to the one in hand. He 
think the defendant was entitled 
to a charge substantially as re-
quested, and that it was not given. 
(127 P. at 277.) 
In Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349 
(1927), then Justice Straup observed: 
As a general rule a trial court 
should not leave the jury to apply 
mere general principles of law to 
a case, as here was done by the 
defendant's requests. The court 
should give the jury what the law 
is as applied to the facts either 
stated or assumed, and if so found 
by the jury. The rule is well 
settled that instructing a jury as 
a mere abstract or general state-
ment as to the law should be avoided, 
and that all instructions should be 
applicable to evidence on either 
one or the other of the respective 
theories of the parties. Instruc-
tions which are not so applicable, 
though abstractly they may be cor-
rect, are not helpful to the jury," 
are apt to be misleading and to be 
improperly applied. That a proposi-
tion may be correct in a sense, and 
yet be inapplicable to the evidence 
or to the issue, is readily per-
ceived. (270 P. at 357.) 
Appellant's proposed instructions 4, 6, and 7 cor-
rectly stated the law, and specifically applied it to the facts 
of the case. ~ot giving them was prejudicial to appellant, and 
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advantangeous to the prosecution. The jury was left to mis-
apply the law according to their whims and emotions, and what 
they thought was proper. Such instructions are not conducive 
"to a just administration of the law,,. and indeed have resulted 
in a miscarriage of justice in the case at bar. The erroneous 
instructions therefore require that appellant's conviction be 
reversed. 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY OF FAILURE 
TO STOP VEHICLE AT COMMAND OF POLICE 
OFFICER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY TEE EVIDENCE. 
The statute under which appellant was charged states: 
41-6-169.10. Failure to stop 
vehicle at command of police 
officer--Penalties.--Stopping 
vehicle at command of police 
officer.--Any driver who, having 
received a visual or audible 
signal from a police officer to 
bring his vehicle to a stop, 
operates his vehicle in willful 
or wanton disregard of such 
signal so as to interfere with 
or endanger the operation of the 
police vehicle, or any other 
vehicle or person, or who in-
creases his speed and attempts 
to flee or elude the police shall 
upon conviction . . . . 
(U.C.A. 1953, emphasis added.) 
Since the definition of '\villful" is precisely the 
same as the definition of "intentional" (see 76-2-103(1), U.C.A. 
(1953) and Point I of this brief), it necessarily follows that 
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appellant could not be convicted of this offense, since he 
lacked the requisite mental element prescribed by the legis-
lature. 
Further, while the term "wanton" is not defined in 
the Utah Criminal Code, Black's Law Dictionary (Revised Fourth 
Edition) notes that the state of mind connoted by "wantonness" 
requires a "[c]onscious doing of some act ... " (p. 1753-4). 
Appellant concedes that, in some cases, "wanton" may 
be defined as " . characterized by extreme recklessness, 
... " (Black's Law Dictionary, supra, p. 1753), but in this 
case such a definition should not be applied. It is difficult 
to see how one could "recklessly" fail to stop upon a clear 
command of a police officer. The failure to stop, in order to 
be an offense, must be a conscious, intentional failure. 
Where the person who fails to so stop lacks the capa-
city to form a conscious, intentional state of mind, then his 
act is not an offense under the statute. 
POINT IV 
THE REVOCATION OF APPELLANT'S PROBATION 
OFFENDS THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. 
Appellant's probation was revoked on the grounds that 
he "refused to take a breathalyzer test, and was involved in 
violent behavior." (Judgment Roll and Index, p. 93; Hearing 
Transcript - 64.) 
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The original judgment, after appellant's jury trial, 
placed him on probation subject to certain terms and condi-
tions, among them the following: 
4. That the said defendant submit 
to a breathalyzer test at the dis-
cretion of the Adult Probation and 
Parole Department within reasonable 
circumstances and laws; . 
(Judgment Roll and Index, p. 85.) 
Appellant executed an agreement on February 20, 1979, 
which states, in pertinent part, that he agreed 
6. To violate no penal law of 
any local, state, or federal 
government and to be of good be-
havior. 
12. To abide by the following 
special conditions, ... (4) 
voluntarily submit to a breath-
alyzer exam upon request of AP&P 
agent . . (Judgment Roll and 
Index, p. 87.) 
Unquestionably, appellant, as a probationer, did not 
enjoy the same expectation of privacy as would a normal citi-
zen. Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment's proscriptions 
against unreasonable searches still have application to the 
case of a probationer (or parolee) , and a probationer has 
standing to raise Fourth Amendment rights (United States ex rel. 
Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); State v. 
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Allison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1970) cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 
(1971); Latta v. Fitzhanis, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.) cert. denied 
423 U.S. 897 (1975); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 
F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136 
(N.D. 1972)). 
The terms of a probation agreement must meet the 
Fourth Amendment's standards of reasonableness (United States 
v. Consuelo-Gonzales, supra). 
It is generally recognized that a probation officer 
may search a probationer's horne on less than probable cause. 
Generally, it is sufficient that the probation officer have a 
good-faith reasonable belief to suspect that probationer has 
violated the terms of his probation. However, the Fourth Amend-
ment forbids searches conducted by a probation officer that 
are arbitrary and abusive. Among the searches that are arbi-
trary and abusive are those conducted at unreasonable hours 
(United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follete, 282 F. Supp. 10 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); People v. Hernandez, 229 C.A.2d 143, 40 Cal. 
Rptr. 100 (1964) cert. denied 381 U.S. 953 (1965) .) 
The trial court recognized the fact that appellant 
could only be asked to submit to a breathalyzer test at a 
reasonable time (see Hr. Tr. 20). 
Apparently, the trial court based its finding that 
it was reasonable to request appellant to submit to a breath-
alyzer test on the facts that 
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the probation officer had a 
report that [appellant] had 
been violent, and secondly that 
he had been drinking, that on 
his approaching him [i.e. 
knocking on appellant's bedroom 
door at 1:00 a.m.] at first he 
got no response and then the 
response he got was in the 
nature of violence, in that he 
opened the door and suddenly 
grabbed [the probation officer] 
and ripped his shirt. 
[Hr. Tr. 65.] 
The "report" that appellant had been violent and had 
been drinking emanated solely from Ms. Begay. According to 
Officer Larry Penrod, Ms. Begay stated that she "lived with 
her boyfriend," appellant, that he had "grabbed her hair," 
"beat her," "threw her outside," and "threatened her with a 
gun or something." (Hr. Tr. 29.) 
Ms. Begay was not present at the revocation hearing. 
On the night in question, she had been drinking, and, in the 
opinion of probation officer Evan Reid, she "could have been" 
intoxicated (Hr. Tr. 23). 
Appellant testified that Ms. Begay had spent only 
the previous night at his residence, and that she had slept on 
the couch in the living room (Hr. Tr. 54,55). After he had 
retired for the night, he was awakened by Ms. Begay, who was 
hitting him, while yelling and screaming (Hr. Tr. 56). Appel-
lant further stated: 
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And I jumped out of bed. And 
the door was partly opened and 
I took and pushed her out there 
on the living room couch. I told 
her to 'sleep in your bed and 
tomorrow morning you can take 
you [sic] stuff out of here, be-
cause I'm not going to put up 
with something like that.' And 
I went back to my bedroom. But 
before I could close the door, 
she hit it full force and knocked 
the door into my head. And I 
still -- I was kind of sleepy. 
That made me a little bit out of 
hand with myself and so I grabbed 
her by the arm and escorted her 
between the partition between the 
dining room and living room and on 
into the kitchen. She might have 
tripped there in the kitchen. But 
I opened the door and deposited her 
out there on the porch and stated 
to her: 'Get sober before you 
come back in. ' 
I closed the kitchen door and walked 
back into the house into my bedroom. 
I closed my door and locked it, be-
cause I didn't want her barging in 
and hitting me anymore. 
(Hr. Tr. 57.) 
The testimony of appellant on this matter is entirely 
uncontradicted. It was also uncontradicted that when the pro-
bation officer [Mr. Reid) requested appellant to submit to a 
breathalyzer test, he had absolutely no information or knowl-
edge of his own perception that appellant had consumed any 
alcoholic beverage (Hr. Tr. 21). 
Under these facts, it is difficult to see how it is 
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reasonable to request appellant to submit to a breathalyzer 
test. The hour was approximately 1:00 a.m. Appellant had to 
be at work early in the morning. (The trial court conceded 
"At least it's true, [the appellant has] a good work record." 
(Hr. Tr. 67.).) The probation officer had absolutely no 
personal knowledge that appellant had been drinking. While 
beer cans were seen in the living room area, where Ms. Begay 
had been staying, none were seen in appellant's room. Further, 
Hs. Begay was apparently intoxicated, and appellant's room-
mate, Mr. Diamanti, was in such a "deep sleep" (i.e. passed 
out) that he could not be awakened by the probation officer's 
shaking him (Hr. Tr. 21). It is at once apparent that the 
empty beer cans seen were, in all probability, consumed solely 
by Mr. Diamanti and Ms. Begay. 
As to the "violence" when appellant ripped the pro-
bation officer's shirt, this confrontation was "extremely 
short," in the probation officer's own words (Hr. Tr. 8). It 
must be remembered that it was roughly 1:00 a.m., and that 
appellant had already been rudely awakened, and indeed tech-
nically battered, that night. To say that this incident vio-
lated the term of the probation agreement requiring appellant 
"[t]o violate no penal law . and to be of good behavior" 
(Judgment Roll and Index, p. 87) would be absurdly over-tech-
nical. Nor can it be said that such conduct, of itself, would 
give rise to a reasonable belief that appellant had been 
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drinking. 
Nor can the presence of beer cans in the living room 
be a basis for a reasonable belief that appellant had been 
drinking them. As discussed above, there are more obvious in-
ferences as to who was drinking the beer. 
Moreover, all of the "evidence" of appellant's 
alleged probation violation was the result of an illegal entry 
and search, and therefore could not serve as a basis to revoke 
appellant's parole. 
It is uncontradicted that no search warrant was in-
volved, nor was the entry and search made incident to an arrest. 
The trial court apparently validated the entry and search on 
the ground of consent by a third person, Hs. Begay (see Hr. Tr. 
11). The court stated: 
Well, of course, it's the opinion 
of the Court that Hs. Begay \vould 
have some proprietary interest in 
that residence. There's enough of 
a showing she lived there. She 
made that representation to the 
officers. She was the one that 
opened the door. Her clothes were 
in the defendant's room, obviously, 
which he admits he thre>v out to her; 
and that she \Vas living there. So 
it's the Court's opinion she would 
have a proprietary interest there. 
Whether she's paying the rent or so 
on, of course, it is immaterial to 
the Court. So therefore the motion, 
of course, to dismiss is denied. 
(Hr. Tr. 62. ) 
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Appellant contends that in this respect the trial 
court erred. There was virtually no showing that Ms. Begay 
lived in appellant's horne. 
As to representations made to the officers, Proba-
tion Officer Evan Reid and the prosecuting attorney engaged in 
the following colloquy: 
Q How did you get entrance 
into the horne? 
A Ms. Lucille Begay stated 
she had lived there, that 
Mr. Potter had asked her 
to reside with him. And 
she opened the door and 
let us into the residence. 
(Hr. Tr. 5.) 
Nowhere is there an affirmative statement that Ms. 
Begay was presently living in appellant's horne. The phrase 
"had lived there" connotes a condition in the past, which had 
since terminated. The phrase, "Mr. Potter had asked her to 
reside with him" obviously does not mean that in fact she was 
presently "living" in his horne. 
It is impossible to see how Ms. Begay's act of open-
ing the door can be construed as showing "a sufficient pro-
prietary interest" to consent to a search. 
Nor is the fact that appellant allowed Ms. Begay to 
keep her clothes in his dresser persuasive of the fact that 
she was living in the horne. It is not unusual for a guest to 
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put his or her clothes in an appropriate closet or dresser 
for even a one-night stay in a hotel. 
Indeed, the fact that all of Ms. Begay's clothing 
was to be found in only one drawer is extremely corroborative 
of the fact that she was merely a guest in the horne for one or 
two nights. 
There is the further fact that appellant had locked 
his door to keep Ms. Begay out. It seems unlikely that one 
who is living in a horne, and allegedly sleeping with one of 
its occupants, would be locked out of the bedroom. 
Finally, there is the fact that Ms. Begay could not 
even be located anywhere in the area for the hearing. This is 
highly inconsistent with her "living" in appellant's horne. 
In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S. Ct. 
988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974), the United States Supreme Court 
stated: 
noted: 
. . . the consent of one who 
possesses common authoritl over 
premises or effects is va id as 
against the absent, nonconsent-
ing person with whom that auth-
ority is shared. 
(415 U.S. at 170, emphasis 
added.) 
As to what constitutes "common authority, the Court 
Common authority is, of course, 
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not to be implied from the mere 
property interest a third party 
has in the property. The auth-
ority which justifies the third-
party consent does not rest upon 
the law of property, with its 
attendant historical and legal 
refinements . . . but rests 
rather on mutual use of the 
property by persons generally 
having joint access or control 
for most purposes, so that it is 
reasonable to recognize that any 
of the co-inhabitants has the 
right to permit the inspection 
in his own right and that the 
others have assumed the r~sk 
that one of their number might 
permit the common area to be 
searched. (415 U.S. at 71, 
n. 7, emphasis added.) 
In United States v. Reisman, 503 F.2d 1284 (8th Cir. 
1974) it was held that a co-tenant who had a legal right to 
enter a portion of premises used by a defendant, but not a 
factual "possessor right," could not consent to a search there. 
In United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1976) it was 
held that an occasional visitor could not validly consent to a 
search. 
Under the logic of the foregoing, it is clear that 
the facts of the case at bar simply fail to disclose a suffi-
cient "common authority" over appellant's horne to enable Ms. 
Begay to consent to a search thereof. 
The facts of the instant case disclose an additional 
element usually not present in "consent to search" cases. 
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Here the consent was given out of a deliberate, hostile motive 
to appellant. While this author could find no case which 
specifically based a holding on this point, the case of United 
States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 
1970) contained the following interesting dicta: 
The right of one party to consent 
to a search which affects the 
interest of another derives from 
the consenting party's equal right 
of possession or control of the 
same premises or property as the 
other. Such cases fall into three 
classes. In one class a party 
having a joint right of control 
consents to a search directed only 
at himself and not at the other, 
but it discloses evidence harmful 
to the other. A second class con-
sists of those cases in which one 
having a joint right of control 
consents to a search which he 
knows is directed at the other 
although he does so in the inde-
pendent exercise of his right of 
joint control. The justification 
of the search in both these classes 
of cases results from the impossi-
bility of severing the joint right 
of control and the undesirability 
of permitting the exercise of the 
right of one to be limited by the 
right of the other. 
A new and intruding element which 
has not been isolated heretofore 
may be said to distinguish a third 
class of cases. This element is 
the consenting party's agreement 
to the search out of motives of 
hostility to the other, made with 
the intent to harm him by an antag-
onistic consent. ~mere it is 
possible to identify this element 
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a serious question would arise 
whether the right to consent is 
not spent when it reaches this 
point of deliberate antagonistic 
intrusion on the rights of the 
other who has an equal right to 
possession or control. This 
would be especially true where 
a wife intentionally acts 
against her husband's interest, 
since she would not be acting 
in harmony with the marital re-
lationship from which her joint 
right of ownership or control is 
derived, but in antagonism to it. 
(431 F.2d at 842-43.) 
Of course, here we are dealing with the alleged con-
sent of one who is only an occasional visitor. Her intentional 
hostile act toward appellant is obviously antagonistic to any 
kind of relationship by which she might arguably be said to 
have a right of "common authority," so that on this additional 
ground, her consent should be deemed invalid. 
In any case where there is a search without a war-
rant, the government bears the burden of showing that the 
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment (United States 
v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Heisman, 503 F.2d 1284 (8th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. 
Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz. 431 F.2d 839 (3rd Cir. 1970)). Here, 
the state has failed to do so. 
Therefore under the total facts of this case, the 
revocation of appellant's probation constitutes a denial of 
his Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable 
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searches, which this court must no allow, 
POINT V 
THE REVOCATION OF APPELLANT'S PROBATION 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
As discussed above in Point IV, the evidence pre-
sented at the revocation hearing showed rather clearly that the 
probation officer's request that appellant submit to a breath-
alyzer test was unreasonable, both as to the circumstances of 
the request, and the hour at which the request came. Evidence 
of a refusal to submit to an unreasonable request to take a 
breathalyzer test is obviously not sufficient to revoke a pro-
bation, 
As to evidence that appellant had engaged in "violent 
behavior" sufficient to revoke his probation, it is to be noted 
that all "evidence" regarding the alleged assault on Ms. Begay 
was purely uncorroborated, unsubstantiated hearsay. The source 
of the hearsay, Ms. Begay herself, was, at the time she uttered 
the statements, intoxicated, and motivated by extreme antago-
nism towards appellant. Those uncorroborated hearsay state-
ments are patently and inherently unreliable, and cannot be 
used as a basis to commit appellant to the penitentiary. 
While there is no doubt good evidence that appellant 
indeed tore the probation officer's shirt, the context in which 
this happened must be remembered. The confrontation was 
"extremely short" (Hr. Tr. 8). It occurred at 1.00 a.m., at 
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the door to appellant's bedroom (Hr. Tr. 6). Appellant had 
that evening already been subjected to a rude awakening and 
technical battery at the hands of Ms. Begay. He was again 
roused from sleep, in his own home, in the middle of the 
night, by a persistent knocking on his bedroom door. Upon 
opening the door, out of the total darkness of his bedroom, 
he was greeted by two flashlight beams shining towards him 
(Hr. Tr. 43). 
Appellant was, in the words of Officer Hansen, "quite 
upset" (Hr. Tr. 43). Under the totality of circumstances, his 
reaction was quite normal. It is of great significance that 
although two probation officers and at least three peace offi-
cers were present when the confrontation occurred, there was 
not the slightest suggestion that appellant had committed a 
crime, even a misdemeanor, in their presence. If so, appel-
lant could have been expediently arrested on the spot. 
In fact, appellant's alleged "violent behavior" was, 
on all counts, justified and neither a violation of any penal 
law, nor an episode of "bad behavior" sufficient to revoke his 
probation. In short, the evidence produced at the revocation 
hearing cannot support the revocation of his probation. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, on the morning of February 22, 1978, appel-
lant engaged in behavior that was dangerously antisocial. He 
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might well have been guilty of exhibition of a deadly weapon 
(§ 76-10-506, U.C.A. (1953)), public intoxication (§ 76-10-506, 
U.C.A. (1953)), Driving Under the Influence (41-6-44, U.C.A. 
(1953)), as these misdemeanor offenses do not require as an 
element the highly culpable "intentional" or "willful" states 
of mind. 
It is equally clear that appellant could not, and 
did not, entertain a specific intent to commit a robbery. 
While it is unquestioned the State has a vital inter-
est in protecting the public, it may not do so by branding one 
a felon, when in fact no felony was committed. 
~or may the State imprison a man (even a properly 
convicted felon, which appellant is not) on the basis of 
alleged probation violations, when there is no reliable evidence 
that in fact the terms and conditions of the probation were 
violated. 
There are ample "remedies" available to the State to 
protect society, and appellant, from the type of incident 
which occurred on February 22, 1978. But charging, and obtain-
ing a conviction for a crime which in fact could not and did 
not occur is not among them. To again quote State v. Brown, 
. . . to sentence a man to the 
penitentiary for a crime that he 
did not have the mental capacity 
to commit would be intolerable. 
(102 P. at 646, emphasls added.) 
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This court should reverse and remand for an entry 
of acquittal to the counts charging aggravated robbery and 
• failure to stop on command of a police officer. It should as 
v1ell reverse the trial court's revocation of appellant's pro-
bation. 
DATED this /:f~day of October, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSEN AND HANSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
B;dQ,~,, l 
' Phil L~sen 
CERTIFICATE-OF SERVICE 
\ 
\ {& I.J 4 ; d "--"'" 
\ 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant were served on the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
----~l~b~~~, ___ day of October, 1979. 
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